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BACKLASH AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF LEGAL
KNOWLEDGE: THE CASE OF CHILD CUSTODY
LAW
by
Susan B. Boyd*
This article argues that legal knowledge is socially constructed rather
than "given" and that law reform and legal change represent struggles over
meaning and over desired norms. When struggles over legal norms arise
between groups that have unequal power in society, analysis of the process
must consider the relationship between knowledge creation and power The
article first reviews literature on 'backlash' or resistance to progressive
social and legal change. It then explains why, as producers of legal knowl-
edge, law schools must ensure that students understand that law is not a neu-
tral set of norms, but rather a site of struggle over social meanings. A case
study is then offered of how backlash discourse has influenced the construc-
tion of legal knowledge in child custody law reform. This part argues that
gendered power relations influence both the ways in which statistics and
social science studies are invoked in law reform processes and the direction
of law reform itself
I. INTRODUCTION
Every year, in their teaching evaluations of my large family law course,
a number of students complain about what they believe to be a dispropor-
tionate emphasis on non-legal and social science material and a lack of
attention to the "real" law contained in cases and statutes.' Some also iden-
tify a disproportionate emphasis in the course on gender, sexual orienta-
tion, race and Aboriginal people. On the other hand, others write that they
appreciate the location of family law in its social context and a few say that
they would have appreciated a stronger feminist approach and a focus on
groups that have been historically disadvantaged under the law. I am cer-
tain that my course and my pedagogical technique could use improve-
ment-every year I revise the materials, hoping for better results, and I
adjust my approach in the classroom. But I have come to believe that the
comments on the evaluations represent a larger issue: a struggle over the
construction of legal knowledge. Many students expect that a law course
will teach them "the rules" and so they experience considerable frustration
when they find--especially in an area of law such as family law that is rid-
dled with discretion and indeterminacy-that the boundaries between law
and society, law and morality, law and politics and law and other disci-
* Professor of Law and Chair in Feminist Legal Studies, Faculty of Law, University of Brit-
ish Columbia. Thanks to the UBC Hampton Fund and the SSHRCC Women and Change
program for funding, to Marilyn MacCrimmon and Claire Young for comments, and to
Lisa Gill and Karey Brooks for research assistance.
I Law 359, Family Law, University of British Columbia Faculty of Law. The two volumes
of course materials include many cases in addition to some contextual material and sec-
ondary literature. Statutes relevant to family law take up a third volume of materials.
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plines are not always discernible. 2 Despite the disruption of traditional
legal knowledge over the past two decades by discourses such as feminist
legal theory, critical race theory and critical legal studies, law students
quickly learn that legal positivism is paradigmatic within legal education-
at least legal education within law schools. 3 When law students encounter
courses that attempt to introduce social context into as many areas as possi-
ble and that challenge the notion of law as a "self-referential system" that is
capable of producing "right answers," 4 they feel that they are being asked
to do work that is extraneous to the task of learning law as a system of
rules. They have a sense that law as a discipline is being inappropriately
expanded. Arguably, there is a growing sense of entitlement to resist such
expansions-a backlash of sorts.
This article offers a basic argument that legal knowledge is socially con-
structed rather than "given" and briefly considers the pedagogical implica-
tions. I illustrate the importance of developing a framework for under-
standing the ways in which legal knowledge is constructed by reference to
a particular area (child custody law). This area reveals the significance of
power struggles in the creation of legal knowledge, as well as the relevance
of "backlash," or resistance to social change. The article has been influ-
enced by discussions within the UBC Hampton project on "The Challenge
of Change: Law as Discipline" about the changing nature of legal knowl-
edge and related challenges to legal education. It has also sprung partly out
of a Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada
(SSHRCC)--funded research project on resistance to feminist-inspired
legal and social change.
In the collaborative research project funded by SSHRCC, I am examin-
ing (with four other scholars) law reforms that have been made over the
past three decades in the fields of child custody, child support and equity
policies in universities. 5 The struggles over these reforms provide case
studies of the social construction of legal knowledge and the relationship
between social knowledge, legal knowledge and power. By providing a
careful study of how the changes to law and policy came about, we want to
determine to what extent those who resist such changes are justified in say-
ing that feminists now control the law reform agenda, that legal change has
2 M. Thornton, "Technocentrism in the Law School: Why the Gender and Colour of Law
Remain the Same" (1998) 36:2 Osgoode Hall LJ. 369 at 372.
3 Ibid. Legal education offered in university programs that do not award LL.B. degrees,
such as the legal studies programs that previously existed at La Trobe University in Aus-
tralia and still exist at Carleton University in Ottawa, arguably escapes some of the pres-
sures of the 'professional' law teaching programs: I. Duncanson, "The Ends of Legal
Studies" (1997) 3 Web J. Curr. Leg. Issues 1, online: Web Journal of Current Legal Issues
Ltd. <http://webjcli.ncl.ac.uk.> (last modified: 28 June 2000); N. Sargent, "Laboring in
the Shadow: A Canadian Perspective on the Perils and Possibilities of Legal Studies" in I.
Duncanson, ed. Legal Education and Legal Knowledge, Special issue of Law in Context
(1991) 9:2 Law in Context 65.
4 Thornton, supra note 2.
5 This is a SSHRCC-funded research project under the Women and Change Strategic
Theme. The Principal Investigator is D. Chunn, and co-investigators are C. Young, H.
Lessard, R. Menzies and myself. The project title is Feminism, Law, and Social Change in
Canada, 1967-97: (Re)Action and Resistance.
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gone too far in empowering women and that special rights are being given
to women. We have nicknamed the project our "backlash" project, even
though we have discovered that serious concerns have been raised about
invocation of the term "backlash." 6 My focus in the project is mainly on
the family law issues and in particular child custody law. I am interested in
whether child custody law is appropriately characterized as an area of law
that is biased against men, a claim that has achieved considerable currency
in recent years.
Each of these two projects takes up the question of the social construc-
tion of legal knowledge, albeit in different ways. In the first part of this arti-
cle, I briefly review some of the literature on "backlash" and resistance to
progressive social and legal change. My objective is to make the point that,
far from representing a neutral process of norm-creation, law reform and
legal change generally represent a struggle over meaning and over desired
norms. In the next part, I explain why it is so important to consider how
legal knowledge is shaped. The construction of legal knowledge is not
straightforward. When the struggle over legal norms arises between groups
that are unequal in society, it is essential that any analysis of the process
take account of the relationship between knowledge creation and power.
This insight has been bolstered in recent years by literature that has
emerged from post-structuralism. I also explain why, in the context of legal
education, it is crucial that students gain an appreciation of the socio-polit-
ical context of legal change and legal discourse. As producers of legal
knowledge, law schools hold a particular responsibility to ensure that stu-
dents and those entering the legal profession understand that law is not
simply a neutral set of norms, but, rather, a site of struggle over social
meanings.
In the second half of the article, I offer examples of how backlash dis-
course-in particular that generated by fathers' rights groups in Canada-
has influenced the construction of legal knowledge in law reform processes
concerning child custody and access. I attempt to show that it is impossible
to understand any process of law reform without taking account of its
social and political context and the struggle over the creation of legal
knowledge. Specifically, I examine the process and hearings of the Special
6 See D. Herman's critique of the concept of 'backlash': The Antigay Agenda: Orthodox
Vision and the Christian Right (Chicago & London: The University of Chicago Press,
1997) in her "Afterword: Thoughts on Backlash and Utopia" at 194-200; J. Newson,
"'Backlash' Against Feminism: A Disempowering Metaphor" (1991) 20:3/4 Resources
for Feminist Research 93. My preliminary reaction is that backlash has a certain currency
and resonance for those engaged in progressive struggles and so I have chosen to use it for
the time being as a form of shorthand. However Newson's concerns are valid: the term
"backlash" tends to focus our attention away from the reality of women's advancement
and toward resistance to it, thereby generating effects that are emotionally and politically
disempowering. As well, it diminishes attention to women's agency and generates a per-
ception of women being in the position of "victims." It diminishes our ability to analyze
and recognize the social dynamics and ongoing nature of resistance and opposition;
instead we tend to think that opposition to progressive struggle comes out of thin air and
without the possibility of anticipation. Finally, the use of "backlash" obscures-the fragile
nature of feminist influence on legal discourse: H. Lessard, "Farce or Tragedy? Judicial
Backlash and Justice McClung" (1999) 10:3 Const. Forum 65.
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Joint (Senate and House of Commons) Committee on Child Custody and
Access of 1998. During this process, fathers' rights groups fairly success-
fully set the agenda by asserting that gender bias in this field operates
against fathers, not mothers and by asserting the crucial need for the "chil-
dren of divorce" to have contact with fathers. 1 then critically examine
these assertions, first, by looking at how the fathers' rights advocates
invoked statistics regarding custody awards and second, by pointing to the
conflicting evidence in social science studies about the benefits of maxi-
mum contact between children of divorce and fathers. This part also shows
how social context is often invoked in legal processes and shows that the
ways in which it is invoked are not necessarily "neutral" or free from
power relations. I show that it would be risky not only to assume that law is
autonomous from social context, but also to assume that law can be read in
light of social context in an uncomplicated manner. Thinking about legal
knowledge as a social construction and thinking about how law in turn con-
stitutes a form of social knowledge is a complex task.
II. BACKLASH: RESISTANCE TO PROGRESSIVE SOCIAL AND
LEGAL CHANGE
Backlash is a word that cropped up frequently at the end of the 1990s.
Feminists were certainly not the only ones to invoke it. Jeffrey Simpson of
the Globe and Mail has written about backlash against changes, such as the
Nisga'a deal, that are intended to redress the operations of colonialist poli-
cies in relation to First Nations people in Canada. 7 We see evidence of
backlash in action in the media and elsewhere. Recently there have been
challenges to the Supreme Court of Canada for using its discretion under
the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms and for responding to the
claims that groups such as women and lesbians and gay men have made in
the name of equality.8 Madame Justice L'Heureux-Dub6's speech in Octo-
ber, 1999 at a Queen's University Faculty of Law Conference on Relation-
ship Recognition and same sex partners prompted a National Post editorial
calling on her to recuse herself from any future cases dealing with same sex
relationships.9 When this stance of the National Post is read against the
reaction earlier in 1999 to L'Heureux-Dub6 J.'s judgment in the Ewanchuk
case, 10 it is perhaps tempting to imagine that backlash-or resistance to
progressive social and legal change-is a new and increasing phenomenon.
Yet scholars have been talking about backlash against progressive social
change for quite some time, showing that resistance to change has existed
throughout history, albeit taking different forms at different times. Walby
7 J. Simpson, "The Cost of Expectations" The Globe and Mail (29 October 1999) A 19.
8 R. Knopff & EL. Morton, "Ardour in the Court" The Globe and Mail (7 April 2000)
A15.Madam Justice R. Abella responded to these challenges in a keynote speech at a con-
ference at Osgoode Hall Law School: "The case for a strong court" The Globe and Mail
(13 April 2000) A15. See S. Alberts, "Class-Action Suit Threatened Over Suffering by
Children of Divorce" The National Post (20 July 1999) A7.
9 "Supreme Bias" The National Post (25 October 1999) A 15.
10 See Lessard, supra note 6.
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argues that "backlash" is a recurring feature in the history of feminism:
"Feminist successes have often met, not only with resistance, but with
renewed determination by patriarchal forces to maintain and increase the
subordination of women.""1 She points out that backlash often focuses on
"the family," an observation that is particularly pertinent to my interest in
the politics of the family and social change and child custody and support
law. For instance, the husband-free women of the suffrage movement were
portrayed as unnatural because they did not engage in sex with men: "Thus
as women won demands on a political level, they were faced with increas-
ing pressures to marry and engage with men at a sexual level, and this
undercut the independence which women had been developing."1 2 Susan
Faludi has also argued that, in the United States, there has been pressure on
women to return to the home, to get married and stay married, to raise
babies and to look after their husbands.1 3 Even if Faludi overlooks the
ways in which women are also entering the public sphere of work, but in a
subordinated manner, t 4 a significant aspect of backlash discourse focuses
on the damage that feminists have supposedly wrought on the family.
Although backlash processes have existed over a significant period of
history, it nevertheless appears that backlash to social change has become
more organized and analytically sophisticated in recent years and therefore
difficult to combat.' 5 In the family law field, groups that resist progressive
changes have utilized rights discourse and, indeed, have employed the lan-
guage of (in)equality that was developed by feminists to understand
women's disadvantage under the law. For example, fathers' rights groups
argue that men experience gender bias against them and in favour of
women in the family law system. They therefore argue that they should
acquire more legal rights to children. Moreover, backlashers "tap into peo-
ple's basic concerns about social stability." 16 It is easy for this invocation
of people's fears to occur in the context of family law reform, where emo-
tional buttons are particularly easy to press,' 7 especially when children are
involved. Fathers have been able to position themselves as a disadvantaged
group in the family law system and they have been able to position them-
selves as advocates on behalf of children's welfare or best interests. Moth-
ers are viewed, despite their protests and arguments to the contrary, as
11 S. Walby, "'Backlash' in Historical Context" in M. Kennedy, C. Lubelska & Val Walsh,
eds., Making Connections: Women's Studies, Women's Movements, Women's Lives (Lon-
don: Taylor & Francis, 1993) 79 at 79; J. Saltzman Chafctz and A.G. Dworkin, "In the
Face of Threat: Organized Antifeminism in Comparative Perspective" (1987) 1 Gender
and Soc. 33.
12 Walby, ibid. at 84. See also L. Faderman, Surpassing the Love of Men: Romantic Friend-
ship and Love Between Women from the Renaissance to the Present (New York: William
Morrow and Company, 1981); S. Jeffreys, The Spinster and her Enemies: Feminism and
Sexuality 1880-1930 (London: Pandora, 1985); Chafetz & Dworkin, supra note 11.
13 S. Faludi, Backlash: The Undeclared War Against Women (London: Chatto & Windas,
1992).
14 Walby, supra note 11 at 86.
15 0. Hankivsky, Resistance to Change: Exploring the Dynamics of Backlash (London: Cen-
tre for Research on Violence Against Women and Children, 1996) 9.
16 Ibid. at 9.
17 Ibid. at 10.
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having benefited from the system and as selfishly asking for more for
themselves (not for their children). As Carol Smart has said, "While father-
hood now represents equality (an element of the higher moral reasoning)
and welfare represents the interest of the child or weakest member, mother-
hood represents some atavistic, pre-new enlightenment claim which would
drag us back into selfish emotion and a satisfaction of the sense rather than
a meeting of objective needs."' 8
Thus, the legal system and the process of law reform constitute sites of
struggle for power over the definition of appropriate parenting rights after
separation or divorce. Some authors have suggested that current child cus-
tody law trends reinforce a version of the traditional patriarchal family
even after adults separate: the mother may be able to separate from her
partner but she is held responsible for ensuring that children retain or
develop a relationship with their father.
1 9
III. LEGAL KNOWLEDGE AND LEGAL EDUCATION
I now turn to the relationship between the backlash theme, the construc-
tion of legal knowledge and the changing nature of legal education. In child
custody law, the case study of this article, the best interests of children is
the operative legal principle. Its content has shifted over time and varia-
tions on the themes of joint custody and shared parenting have emerged as
the preferred law reform options in 'many western countries such as
England, Australia and, increasingly, Canada. Lawyers and legal policy-
makers need to understand the social and political underpinnings of these
legal concepts. These discourses and law reforms-this legal knowledge-
have not arisen out of nowhere, but are the product of political struggles
over issues such as the roles of mothers and fathers, the gendered nature of
caregiving, where children should live after separation or divorce, who
should pay for expenses related to those children and so on.
Many legal realists, critical legal scholars, law and society scholars, crit-
ical race scholars and feminist legal scholars have shown that the institu-
tionalized conception of legal knowledge as primarily a positivist
conception limits our ability to adequately understand the operation of law.
Rather than limiting our understanding of law to the technicalities of the
rules, and rather than divorcing legal theory from legal practice, it is crucial
that we focus on the processes of construction of the meaning of law.
2 0
Moreover, any claim that law operates autonomously from other social
18 C. Smart, "The Legal and Moral Ordering of Child Custody" (1991) 18:4J.L. & Soc. 485
at 499; emphasis in original.
19 D.M. Bourque, "Reconstructing the Patriarchal Nuclear Family: Recent Developments in
Child Custody and Access in Canada" (1995) 10:1 Can. J.L. & Soc. at 1; S.B. Boyd, "is
There an Ideology of Motherhood In (Post) Modem Child Custody Law?" (1996) 5 Soc. &
Leg. Stud. 496.
20 This part of my paper has been influenced especially by A. Parashar's chapters "Introduc-
tion"at 1 and "Feminism in Indian Legal Education" at 89 in A. Dhanda & A. Parashar,
eds., Engendering Law: Essays in Honour of Lotika Sarkar (Lucknow: Eastern Book
Company, 1999).
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institutions is no longer plausible. The connections between law and other
social institutions-such as the family-must, therefore, be traced. Law
derives its meaning from the intersection and interaction of various social
systems, including law itself. As Parashar puts it,
The task of legal analysts therefore must be to unravel how various levels of
meanings are constituted institutionally. The single most important point for
any legal theory therefore is the acceptance of the idea that meaning-
including legal meaning-is constructed rather than pre-existing and simply
waiting to be discovered.
21
Parashar has pointed out that an understanding that law is connected to
other social institutions can lead to a defeatist attitude that law is a limited
instrument in achieving progressive social change or that legal change is
unimportant and that what is really needed is wider societal change. How-
ever, it is not possible-nor would it be wise-to disengage from the law.
22
Therefore, it is crucial to develop a body of legal scholarship and an
approach to legal education that posits the social construction of the mean-
ing of law as a central question and asks students to critically examine the
assumptions upon which law or law reform rest. Moreover, as we challenge
legal knowledge, we simultaneously and connectedly need to challenge the
processes through which we develop intellectual communities, including
through legal education. 23 Parashar argues that post-structuralist theory has
given us the central insight that all knowledge is constructed and that
knowledge and power are symbiotic.
Applying these insights to the field of child custody law, an understand-
ing of the processes of resistance to social and legal change (or backlash)
can help us to appreciate some of the processes through which fathers'
rights discourse has captured the imagination of the public, the media and,
very likely, some lawmakers. In turn, this discourse has an impact on the
construction of legal knowledge in this field. Even if the more extreme
views of the fathers' rights groups are not endorsed by lawmakers, these
views are taken into account in establishing any middle ground, or compro-
mise, for law reform initiatives. Lawyers and others who work in these
fields of law need to understand the historical reasons why feminists make
certain arguments at particular points in time, why fathers' rights groups
make other arguments and why certain arguments (often those of the
fathers' rights groups, appealing to traditional notions of family) may have
21 Parashar, supra note 20 at 11. See also D. Bell & E. Edmonds, "Students as Teachers,
Teachers as Learners" (1993) 9:8 Mich. L.R. 2025 at 2038 et seq., critiquing the legal pos-
itivism of H.T. Edwards in "The Growing Disjunction Between Legal Education and the
Legal Profession" (1992) 9:1 Mich. L.R. 34.
22 Parashar, supra note 20 at 11.
23 A.P. Harris has argued that the process of building a community (in her context, a critical
race community) is linked to, and is as crucial as, the process of engaging in the intellec-
tual work of critically analyzing the relationship between race and law: "Building Theory,
Building Community" (1999) 8:3 Soc. & Leg. Stud. 313. Harris argues that the lessons of
feminism might prove instructive in this process.
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more purchase in the public imagination than others. Otherwise they may
falsely assume that all knowledges are equally persuasive in the creation of
legal norms.
In many areas of law-but especially in child custody law-judges are
given considerable discretion to make decisions under statutes that lay out
general principles. For example, the "best interests of the child"-a notori-
ously indeterminate concept-is the paramount principle that guides child
custody decision-making. This type of law is particularly susceptible to
influence by dominant ideas of a particular period. In the past, judges often
relied on common sense notions of what was best for children in making
their decisions. Sometimes these common sense notions were sexist and/or
highly moralistic. For instance, a mother who had committed adultery or
who was lesbian might lose custody of a child even though she had consis-
tently been the primary caregiver of a child.24 Some have suggested that if
judges were educated with feminist knowledge about the roles of women
and caregiving patterns, they might make decisions that were more reflec-
tive of actual conditions in society (such as the predominant female respon-
sibility for child care) rather than relying on biased or moralistic views. 25
In Canada we have developed judicial education programs that attempt to
make judges aware of the social context within which they make their deci-
sions. 26 In effect, these initiatives attempt to make lawyers, judges and law
reformers more aware and self-reflective about the processes through
which social knowledge is incorporated into law and also about which
forms of social knowledge are more powerful. Some law school educators
similarly attempt to weave social context and discussion of power relations
into family law courses.
27
However, social knowledge is not necessarily received "objectively" by
students, lawyers or judicial decision-makers. The reactions of my family
law students provide some evidence of this point. Moreover, as I suggest in
the next section, feminist knowledge does not operate on a level playing
field with other bodies of knowledge, at least in the child custody context.
IV. INCORPORATING SOCIAL KNOWLEDGE INTO LEGAL
KNOWLEDGE: A NON-LEVEL PLAYING FIELD
Feminist arguments in the field of custody and access law often appear
to be regressive in their emphasis on looking at the past relationships of
parents and children, asking questions such as which parent has been pri-
24 K. Arnup, "'Mothers Just Like Others': Lesbians, Divorce, and Child Custody in Canada"
(1989) 3:1 CJ.W.L. 18.
25 Parashar, supra note 20 at 100-103.
26 T.B. Dawson, "The National Judicial Institute Social Context Judicial Education Project:
A Retrospective and Prospectus," Discussion Paper for A Judicial Education Consultation
with Judges, Academics and Community Leaders, Aylmer, Ou~bec, June 20-21, 2000.
Available at the National Judicial Institute, 300-161 Laurier Avenue West, Ottawa,
Ontario KIP 5J7.
27 For example M.J. Mossman at Osgoode Hall Law School & B. Cossman at the University
of Toronto Faculty of Law. See S.B. Boyd, "Teaching Policy Issues in Family Law"
(1989) 8 Can. J. Faro. L. 1 at 11.
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marily responsible for caregiving of a child and arguing for some legal rec-
ognition of the burdens of caregiving. 28 In contrast, fathers' rights
arguments often appear to be future-focused and enlightened in their sup-
posed emphasis on what is best for children, their focus on sharing parent-
ing and so on. Fathers' rights groups have often invoked social science
studies that appear to show that children will benefit after separation or
divorce from contact with both parents. Since children tend to live prima-
rily with their mothers after parents separate, this point really implies that
contact with fathers is necessary. Although the social science studies are
divided on this point and identify important caveats, the dominant dis-
course on the subject effectively links contact with fathers to the well-being
of children. For instance, in a recent article in Law Now, an Alberta lawyer
stated, without caveats, "It is axiomatic that a child benefits from continued
contact with both parents and those extended family members who are
interested in that child's wellbeing."
29
It is instructive to examine how this argument is constructed and sus-
tained by fathers' rights groups and how they have established a voice in
law reform fora. In the recent debates on reform of child custody and
access law, these groups (with names such as Fathers for Justice, Family of
Men, Fathers are Capable Too (FACT), New Vocal Man Inc.) captured the
attention of the public, the media and some law reformers by arguing that
gender bias has operated against fathers and by linking their concerns
about gender bias to the interests of children. A Special Joint (Senate and
House of Commons) Committee on Child Custody and Access held public
consultations during 1998 and wrote a report entitled For the Sake of the
Children.30 The Committee was set up, in the first place, as a response to
the complaints of fathers' rights groups about the 1997 reforms to child
support. At that time, the federal government introduced child support
guidelines, eliminated taxation of child support payments in the hands of
the custodial parent and strengthened child support enforcement mecha-
nisms.31 These changes were widely perceived to be a response to feminist
arguments and to favour custodial mothers, despite the fact that the federal
government had been discussing child support guidelines for some years
and that there is disagreement among feminists about whether child sup-
port guidelines are a reform that will address effectively the poverty of
women and children. 32 Some feminists argue that guidelines may have the
28 See S.B. Boyd, "Custody, Access, and Relocation in a Mobile Society: (En)Gendering the
Best Interests Principle" in D.E. Chunn & D. Lacombe, eds., Law as a Gendering Practice
(Toronto: Oxford University Press, 2000) 158.
29 G. Andreiuk, "Reforming the Framework in Which Custody and Access Decisions are
Made" (2000) 24:5 Law Now 19 at 21.
30 Special Joint Committee on Child Custody and Access, For the Sake of the Children, Final
Report (Ottawa: Public Works and Government Services Canada, 1998).
31 Federal, Bill C-41, An Act to amend the Divorce Act, the Family Orders and Agreements
Enforcement Assistace Act, the Garnishment, Attachment and Pension Diversion Act and
the Canada Shipping Act, 2d Sess., 35th Parl., 1996, (passed May 1997).
32 C.F.L. Young, "Tax, Child Support and Equality: It Should All Have Been So Simple"
(Opening Plenary, Canadian Law and Society 'Association Conference, 1 June 2000)
[unpublished).
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effect of depressing the quantum of child support awards; 33 others argue
that a broader, less privatized approach to child support is required.
34
As the Introduction to For the Sake of the Children states, these child
support law reforms passed through the Senate Committee only when the
Hon. Allan Rock, Minister of Justice at the time, agreed to strike a parlia-
mentary committee consisting of Senators and Members of the House of
Commons to study issues related to custody .and access. One Senator in
particular, Anne Cools, was vocal in her insistence that the stories told by
non-custodial fathers be taken into account. She became a public advocate
on behalf of the fathers' rights groups that appeared before the Committee,
arguing for shared parenting, against a focus on male violence against
women, for penalties for mothers who appeared to make false allegations
of abuse and so on.35 These arguments were based on an assumption that
gender bias in the courts is experienced mainly by fathers.
In the final report of the Special Joint Committee, the section on "Gen-
der Bias in the Courts" 36 focused entirely on fathers' experience of gender
bias: "many witnesses expressed the view that judges still operate on the
presumption that mothers are better parents." 37 No reference was made to
mothers' experiences of gender bias, the undervaluing of their primary car-
egiving, the overlooking of domestic abuse by the courts and so on. Nor
was Canadian academic literature on these subjects cited.38 The section,
consisting of only two paragraphs, concluded with quotations from Wayne
Allen of "Kids Need Both Parents" alleging that "it is not unusual to find
that the custodial parent is using the child as a weapon in the matrimonial
warfare and is sabotaging the access visits" and arguing that courts should
start with the assumption that "continued involvement of both parents in
the child's life is the desired goal."'39 This quote promotes a view of custo-
dial mothers as manipulative and selfish, as well as a view that a norm of
shared parenting in legislation would empower fathers and solve these
problems. Yet statements such as these are not supported by the research.
Studies show that most custodial mothers (and mothers do have custody of
children more often than fathers) would like to see more participation by
33 Canada, National Association of Women and the Law, The Child Support Guidelines:
NAWL INational Association of Women and the Law] Response to Amendments to the
Divorce Act and the Working Draft of the Federal Child Support Guidelines (Ottawa:
National Association of Women and the Law, 1996).
34 M.J. Mossman, "Child Support for Our Children?: Re-thinking 'Public' and 'Private' in
Family Law" (1997) 46 U.N.B.LJ. 63.
35 See N. Bala, "A Report from Canada's 'Gender War Zone': Reforming the Child-Related
Provisions of the Divorce Act" (1999) 16 Can. J. Fain. L. 163; M. Laing, "For the Sake of
the Children: Preventing Reckless New Laws" (1999) 16 Can. J. Fain. L. 229; B. Dia-
mond, "The Special Joint Committee on Custody and Access: A Threat to Women's
Equality Rights" (1999) 19:1 &2 Can. Woman Stud. 182. Senator Cools was the first black
woman appointed to the Senate, in 1984: T.B. Dawson, Women, Law and Social Change,
31d ed. (North York: Captus Press Inc., 1998) at 120.
36 For the Sake of the Children, supra note 30 at 15-16.
37 Ibid. at 15.
38 The literature includes Boyd, supra note 19; Bourque, supra note 19; M. Rosnes, "The
Invisibility of Male Violence in Canadian Child Custody and Access Decision-Making"
(1997) 14:1 Can. J. Faro. L. 31.
39 For the Sake of the Children, supra note 30 at 16.
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fathers in their children's lives, not less.40 Still, a key recommendation of
the Special Joint Committee was that "shared parenting" should replace the
concepts of "custody" and "access" in the Divorce Act4 ' and other family
laws. The Government of Canada endorsed this reform direction and also
suggested that unwarranted allegations of abuse must be strongly con-
demned.42
The omission of arguments by women's groups in the gender bias sec-
tion of the report must be placed in the context of the Joint Committee's
mandate, itself the subject of a power struggle initiated by Senator Cools.
The mandate was:
[T]o examine and analyze issues relating to custody and access arrangements
after separation and divorce, and in particular, to assess the need for a more
child-centred approach to family law policies and practices that would
emphasize joint parental responsibilities and child focused parenting
arrangements based on children's needs and best interests.
43
The wording of the mandate differed somewhat from the original wording
proposed and strengthened the emphasis on joint parenting arrangements.
This shift in focus resulted from an amendment moved by Senator Cools
on October 28, 1997 and adopted by the Senate.44 The original mandate,
contained in a motion of Senator Pearson, seconded by Senator Carstairs,
read as follows:
[Tbo examine and analyze issues relating to parenting arrangements after
separation and divorce, and in particular, to assess the need for a more child-
centred approach to family law policies and practices that would emphasize
parental responsibilities rather than parental rights and child-focused parent-
ing arrangements based on children's needs and best interests.
45
Thus, from the start, the Committee was oriented towards a preference for
joint parenting arrangements and the link between joint parenting and the
interests of children was already assumed. The original mandate would not
have made this assumption, but left open a determination of what parenting
arrangements and responsibilities might be more child-centred.
Joint custody has long been a central plank of the political platform of
40 For a review of the literature, see Laing, supra note 35 at 261-64; D. Perry et al., Access to
Children Following Parental Relationship Breakdown in Alberta (Calgary: Canadian
Research institute for Law and the Family, 1992) at 37ff.
41 Divorce Act, R.S.C. 1985 (2 "d Supp.), c. 3.
42 Department of Justice Canada, Government of Canada's Response to the Report of the
Special Joint Committee on Child Custody and Access: Strategy for Reform (Ottawa:
Department of Justice, May 1999), online: Department of Justice Canada <htp:canada.
justice.gc.ca/en/dept/pub/cca/sjcarp0 2 .html> (last modified: 10 May 1999).
43 For the Sake of the Children, supra note 30 at 1 (emphasis added).
44 Special Joint Committee on Child Custody and Access, Journals of the Senate in For the
Sake of the Children, Final Report (Ottawa: Public Works & Government Services Can-
ada, 1998) at x.
45 Ibid. at ix (emphasis added).
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fathers' rights advocates. When the Canadian Divorce Act was revised in
the mid-1980s, these groups lobbied hard for a presumption in favour of
joint legal custody.46 Although they were ultimately unsuccessful, the dis-
course of joint custody became increasingly influential. During the child
custody law reform debates of the 1990s, it remained a key argument of the
fathers' rights groups, but was often rendered as "shared parenting" rather
than joint custody. Feminists and women's groups were quick to point out
the gendered impact of most joint custody arrangements: mothers tend to
retain most responsibility for child care labour, whilst fathers gain the abil-
ity to make or veto decisions concerning the child.47 Once a joint custody
arrangement is in place, it becomes much more difficult for a parent with
primary physical care of a child (usually a mother) to exercise discretion in
relation to their children or to make decisions in relation to their own lives,
such as relocation to another geographical location. As Anne Marie Delo-
rey put it, the "increasing acceptance of joint legal custody ... focuses on
the legal right to control women and children rather than the legal obliga-
tion to care for children."
48
Most critics have no objection to joint or shared parenting arrangements
made through voluntary agreement of the parents. Yet some authors have
suggested that joint physical custody may not meet the needs of children,
especially young children who need stability and continuity and round-the-
clock caretaking. 49 For most, the concern lies with imposed joint custody
arrangements. They point out that policy-makers and law reformers have
inappropriately jumped to the conclusion that joint physical custody is the
optimal way of ensuring that children benefit from the maintenance of rela-
tionships with both parents after divorce. Social scientists who have studied
the adjustment patterns of "children of divorce" have, by and large, not rec-
ommended imposition of joint physical custody.50 As well, Maccoby and
Mnookin have concluded that "joint legal custody is neither the solution to
the problem of maintaining the involvement of divorced fathers, nor a cata-
lyst for either increasing or softening conflict in divorcing families."
51
Despite this evidence from the social sciences indicating caution about
the use of joint custody as a presumptive legal norm, fathers' rights groups
argue that it would achieve two goals. First, it would eliminate bias against
fathers in the legal system and, second, it would be beneficial for children.
For instance, one group said in its oral submission to the Special Joint
Committee: "Right now, there is a gender bias in favour of women in the
46 House of Commons, Standing Committee on Justice and Legal Affairs, Minutes of Pro-
ceedings and Evidence, Nos. 32-50 (11 June 1985 - 23 October 1985). A.M. Delorey,
"Joint Legal Custody: A Reversion To Patriarchal Power" (1989) 3:1 CJ.WL. 33.
47 Delorey, ibid.
48 Ibid. at 44. See also Smart, supra note 18 who draws a distinction between caring about
and caring for children, a distinction that often falls along gendered lines.
49 M.A. Mason, The Custody Wars: Why Children are Losing the Legal Battle, and What We
Can Do About It (New York: Basic Books, 1999) at 63.
50 A. Harvison Young, "Joint Custody as Norm: Solomon Revisited" (1994) 32 Osgoode
Hall LJ. 785 at 789.
51 E.E. Maccoby & R.H. Mnookin, Dividing the Child: Social and Legal Dilemmas of Cus-
tody (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1992) at 289.
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family court system." 52 This perception of bias against fathers and the
emphasis on the crucial need for contact between children and fathers are
arguably misplaced, as I hope to show.
Nevertheless, many members of the public, many family lawyers and
much of the media have accepted that fathers do experience gender bias in
the legal system and that contact with both parents always promotes the
best interests of children after separation or divorce of the parents. Thus,
the social knowledge that influences law reform is potentially distorted,
which, in turn, means that legal knowledge is unlikely to be neutral or
objective. A deeper analysis of the social context within which child cus-
tody law operates and the social science studies on the children of divorce
assist in deconstructing these assumptions. I will first examine the relation-
ship between statistics and the perception that fathers are unfairly treated in
the legal system. I will then briefly examine the relationship between social
science studies on the children of divorce and the notion that maximum
contact between children and both parents post divorce is beneficial for all
children.
A. Statistics on Divorce and Child Custody Awards
Until recently, statistics on child custody and access in Canada have
been notoriously poor and incomplete. 53 These statistics have been used by
fathers' rights advocates to bolster their argument that fathers are discrimi-
nated against in the legal system. The data on which they are based are col-
lected, in the main, by the Central Divorce Registry of the Department of
Justice from courts in each province and territory. The Central Divorce
Registry then releases the data to Statistics Canada for processing and
release. This means that statistics are available only for custody assign-
ments that are made in the context of a divorce, thereby excluding separa-
tions of married parents who choose not to pursue a divorce and
separations of common law couples. As well, the figures are available only
for those custody assignments that are made or affirmed in a court order,
thus excluding arrangements negotiated less formally. The statistics do,
however, include negotiated arrangements that are rubber-stamped by a
judge (consent orders).
Despite the flaws, the figures do not indicate the dire scenario of dis-
crimination against men that was painted by the fathers' rights groups. In
1998, mothers received sole custody in approximately 59.5 per cent of cus-
tody awards included in divorce court orders, fathers in approximately 9.5
52 Parents Helping Parents Submission, Special Joint Committee on Child Custody and
Access, Proceedings of the Special Joint Committee on Child Custody and Access
(Ottawa: Public Works and Government Services, 1998) [hereinafter Proceedings],
online: Parliamentary Intcmet <http://www.parl.gc.ca> (last modified: 1t) August 2000) at
I May 1998.
53 The release of data from the National Longitudinal Survey of Children and Youth
(NLSCY) has changed this situation to some degree, as I explain below. See N. Marcil-
Gratton & C. Le Bourdais, Custody, Access and Child Support: Findings From the
National Longitudinal Survey of Children and Youth (Presented to the Child Support
Team, Department of Justice Canada, 1999). Most groups that presented to the Special
Joint Committee in 1998 relied on the older data.
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per cent and joint custody was awarded in approximately 30.5 per cent of
cases.54 These most recent statistics available show that joint custody
awards have risen significantly since 1994, when they were at 20 per cent.
The statistics do not indicate to what extent joint physical custody, as
opposed to joint legal custody, is being awarded. Nevertheless, it seems
clear that the legal system has been responsive to calls for joint custody
awards and that fathers are getting some form of custody in about 40 per
cent of cases that are dealt with one way or another in court.
In addition to the Statistics Canada data, a more indepth study of 1478
divorce files in 1988, conducted and published by the Department of Jus-
tice, examined a sample of cases in St. John's, Montr6al, Ottawa and
Saskatoon. Interviews were conducted with some parties.55 That study
found that in 43.5 per cent 56 of cases where fathers requested sole custody
and were the petitioner, they received it. As well, they received joint cus-
tody in 8.7 per cent57 of these cases. The study also found that joint custody
was more likely to be the outcome when there was a level of dispute requir-
ing third party negotiation or court involvement. 58 Central Divorce Regis-
try Data showed that, in 1986, joint legal custody was more than twice as
likely when fathers rather than mothers were the petitioner.
59
Given the fact that in the vast majority of heterosexual households the
mother remains primarily responsible for child care, the "success rate" of
fathers in legal applications for custody is arguably quite good. Any sug-
gestion that the courts are biased against fathers is diminished further when
one realizes that the statistics above include consent orders-in other
words, cases where parents agree to an arrangement without a court-
imposed order.6° These figures give us little qualitative data about the pro-
cess through which custody awards are reached, whether custody arrange-
ments were contested and what the details of the awards are. As Marie
Abdemalik has pointed out, the statistics are "somewhat misleading and
certainly cannot capture or reflect a range of important issues. For exam-
ple, to say that mothers receive sole custody in 74.6% of cases does not
reflect the quality or extent of sole legal custody awarded."61 Increasingly,
54 Canada, Statistics Canada (Health Statistics Division), Divorces, 1998, Catalogue No.
84F0213XPB (Ottawa: Statistics Canada, 1999) at 24 - 27.
55 Canada, Department of Justice, Evaluation of the Divorce Act. Phase I: Monitoring and
Evaluation (Ottawa: Bureau of Review, 1990) [hereinafter Evaluation of the Divorce Act].
56 Ibid. table 4.20 at 103.
57 Ibid. table 4.20 at 103.
58 Ibid. at 105.
59 Ibid. table 4.20 at 103. A Pilot Project of the Department of Justice, Law Reform Division,
looked at custody and access determinations for separations and divorces in Hamilton and
Hull. In 86 per cent of these cases, sole custody was awarded, and in 9 per cent of cases
joint legal custody was awarded, and in 5 per cent of cases, split custody was awarded.
One couple received joint physical custody. Mothers were the sole custodial parents in 91
per cent of cases. Canada, Department of Justice Canada, Research and Statistics Divi-
sion, Desmond Ellis, Ph.D. Technical Report - Custody, Access and Child/Spousal Sup-
port: A Pilot Project (Department of Justice Canada, 1995).
60 Evaluation of the Divorce Act, supra note 55 at 104-105.
61 M. Abdemalik, "Best Interests of the Child?" Contemporary Canadian Post-Separation
Custody and Access Issues (M.A. Thesis, Department of Sociology and Anthropology,
Simon Fraser University 1999) [unpublished] at 58.
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sole custody awards include terms and conditions that limit the terms and
authority of sole custody, resulting in a form of joint guardianship even if
the mother, in strict legal terms, retains sole custody.62 The qualitative
terms of custody awards may thus restrict mothers' rights more than is
immediately apparent.
The recent analysis of data on children's family history and custody from
the National Longitudinal Survey of Children and Youth (NLSCY) has
provided information on separations of non-married as well as married par-
ents. 63 In Canada, generally, parents reported that they either had a court
order, or were in the process of obtaining one, in only 48 per cent of cases.
Resort to the legal system was higher for parents who had divorced and
higher where parents said that living arrangements and visiting rights were
a source of tension. Thus, it seems that courts may be receiving a greater
percentage of the "hard" cases, whereas consensual arrangements may be
organized extra-judicially in the main. In court-ordered custody arrange-
ments, close to 80 per cent of children under the age of 12 were placed in
their mother's custody, 7 per cent in their father's and 13 per cent in a
shared physical custody arrangement. The figures shifted as children grew
older. Children of common law unions and younger children were more
likely to be in their mothers' custody, as were children where no court
order existed. Few children covered by court orders for shared physical
custody actually shared residence with both parents. The NLSCY data thus
offers more nuance but confirms that mothers retain responsibility for chil-
dren in most cases where parents separate. It remains unclear whether
fathers are discriminated against, or whether orders reflect the social reali-
ties of gendered patterns of caregiving.
Despite the partial nature of Canadian statistics on custody and access,
these figures are used by scholars and by fathers' rights advocates to bol-
ster an argument that the legal system is biased in favour of mothers and
against fathers.64 For example, the central hypothesis of Millar and Gold-
enberg is that, since the legal standards by which child custody determina-
tions are guided have changed over time (i.e., paternal presumption, to
tender years doctrine, to best interests of the child principle), court awards
of custody should also have changed. They thus predicted that "outcomes
would show assignments first primarily to the father, then to the mother,
and currently more equally to the mother and father, as well as increasingly
to some form of joint custody., 65 Instead, based on statistics, the authors
find that mothers are still far more likely to receive custody than fathers.
They then explore briefly various reasons for this discrepancy that have
been raised by feminists. For example, they discount the notion that fathers
do not press for custody of children, based on the 1988 Department of Jus-
62 Boyd, supra note 28; Bourque, supra note 19.
63 Marcil-Gratton and Le Bourdais, supra note 53.
64 See e.g. J. Pulkingham, "Private Troubles, Private Solutions: Poverty Among Divorced
Women and the Politics of Support Enforcement and Child Custody Determination"
(1994) Can. J. L. & Soc. 73.
65 P. Millar & S. Goldenberg, "Explaining Child Custody Determinations in Canada" (1998)
13:2 Can. J.L. & Soc. 209 at 214.
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tice study which found that although few custody disputes go to court, cus-
tody is disputed (initially) in "upwards of 90 percent" of divorce cases.
66
They then address the notion that custody awards to mothers may be "a
function of factors associated with the sex of the parent which also serve
the best interests of the child.",67 If this is not true, and they attempt to show
it is not, then, they say "it would be tantamount to claiming that decisions
overwhelmingly in favour of women would be due to nothing but their
gender, and this would be sexist."
68
Millar and Goldenberg discount feminist arguments that custody awards
reflect the fact that women tend to be primary caregivers of children far
more than men, regardless of whether they are employed and regardless of
whether they are living in intact families or have separated or divorced from
the other parent. 69 They cite the incidence of women in the labour force,
including working single mothers, and suggest that women are spending
less time in the home. They add, in an effort to take account of women's
responsibility for the second shift: "It also appears that, despite the efforts of
many working mothers to put in a 'second shift,' mothers in paid employ-
ment outside the home spend less time in child-care related activities than
those not employed outside the home." 70 They acknowledge that working
mothers put in more hours in child-care related activities than working
fathers, but argue that the underlying gap in gender roles is decreasing over
time. Millar and Goldenberg also suggest that "divorce may reduce the
amount of time available for the children, in the struggle to overcome the
decrease in income experienced by both parents." 71 Therefore, they say, the
fact that "women are being awarded custody of their children in over-
whelming numbers and at rates increasing over time, compared to men" 72 is
not explained by women's primary caregiving responsibilities.
Millar and Goldenberg also mention the "breastfeeding factor": "Breast
feeding is likely to occur in the first year or less of a child's life, and so this
issue may be moot for the vast preponderance of cases." 73 They overlook
66 Ibid. at 217. The Department of Justice report actually states that "upwards of 90 per cent
of separation and divorce cases apparently involve, initially, some degree of dispute and
the potential, therefore, to be a contested case." Evaluation of the Divorce Act, supra note
55 at 49. Statistics Canada reports that in 1998, out of a total of 37,851 children in
divorces where custody orders were made, husbands applied for custody of only 9,257
children, in contrast to wives who applied for custody of 24,282 children; husbands and
wives were joint applicants in relation to 4,312 children, supra note 54. It seems, there-
fore, that mothers press for custody of children more often than fathers.
67 Millar & Goldenberg, supra note 65 at 217.
68 Ibid.
69 Statistics Canada has found that women still take disproportionate responsibility for
domestic labour and child care: K. Marshall, Statistics Canada, "Employed Parents and
Division of Labour" Cat. No. 75-001-XPE (1993) Winter 5:3 Perspectives on Labour and
Income 23; K. Marshall, Statistics Canada, "Dual Earners: Who's Responsible for House-
work?" (1993) Winter Canadian Social Trends 11; C. Silver, Statistics Canada, "Being
There: The Time Dual-Eamer Couples Spend With Their Children" (2000) Summer
Canadian Social Trends 26.
70 Millar & Goldenberg, supra note 65 at 218.
71 Ibid. at 218.
72 Ibid. at 218-219.
73 Ibid. at 219.
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the complex ways in which women's primary responsibility for children is
structured and reinforced through gendered relations in society, not only by
breast feeding, but also by factors such as workplace structures and access
to parental leave.
74
When they turn to nurturing, rather than identifying the actual extent of
participation by men in their children's lives,75 Millar and Goldenberg
describe studies showing that custodial fathers are just as nurturing as cus-
todial mothers. In the next section on "Gender and Parenting Abilities,"
they point out, again, that there are "few genuine differences in abilities by
gender" and these "are not significant factors in the ability to parent, any
more than they are significant factors in the workplace." 76 In other words,
if women want to have equality in the labour force, they must give fathers
"equal rights" over children. Millar and Goldenberg say: "some would
argue that gender differences do not affect a woman's ability in the work-
place, but, at the same time, make her superior in the home. This double
standard is difficult to defend." '77 Yet feminist critics of fathers' rights
interventions in the family law field rarely argue that men are incapable of
nurturing or good parenting. Rather they argue that for a variety of com-
plex socio-economic reasons, fathers rarely devote themselves to parenting
in the way that mothers do. Most women would prefer that men engage in
more parenting labour, but achieving this result is easier said than done due
to economic and social impediments. 78 It is therefore inappropriate to
introduce laws that overlook women's primary caregiving. Millar and
Goldenberg also suggest that "assigning custody primarily to mothers pro-
duces less desirable outcomes than a more gender balanced approach, 79
citing a stud 8° indicating that children of single mothers are at increased
risk regardless of the poverty level of the family.
8 1
Having concluded that social science studies provide no reason for cus-
tody awards to mothers in greater numbers than fathers, Millar and Golden-
berg turn to the legal system. They find that although sole custody awards
to mothers declined slowly until 1986, a "sharp and consistent increase"
began in 1987, despite the gender neutral language of the Divorce Act,
1986.82 They note that the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms was
introduced in early 1982 and that, although it "provides both sexes equal
74 N. lyer, "Some Mothers Are Better Than Others: A Re-examination of Maternity Bene-
fits" in S.B. Boyd ed., Challenging the Public/Private Divide: Feminism, Law, and Public
Policy (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1997) 168.
75 For example M. Eichler, Family Shifts: Families, Policies, and Gender Equality (Toronto:
Oxford University Press, 1997) at 75.
76 Millar & Goldenberg, supra note 65 at 220.
77 Ibid. at 221.
78 lyer, supra note 74.
79 Millar & Goldenberg, surpa note 65 at 220.
80 Canada, Statistics Canada, Growing Up in Canada: National Longitudinal Survey of Chil-
dren and Youth, Catalogue No. 89-550-MPE96001 (Ottawa: Statistics Canada, 1996).
81 Millar & Goldenbcrg, supra note 65 at 220.
82 They fail to point out or realize that most custody legislation, and certainly the first federal
Divorce Act of 1968, R.S.C. 1970, c. D-8. had been gender neutral well before the 1986
Act.
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benefit of the law,"83 it had not had a perceptible effect on custody out-
comes. Millar and Goldenberg feel that the rise in number of female judges
during the 1980s was too small to explain the continuation and (they argue)
rise in maternal custody awards.
Having failed to find any other explanation for continued sole custody
awards to mothers, Millar and Goldenberg turn to judicial education, find-
ing that the first seminars on gender issues for the judiciary began in the
mid 1980s, focusing on "how the legal system is unfair to women." 84 They
cite two feminist articles on custody in Equality and Judicial Neutrality, a
collection of papers from an early conference directed towards education
of judges.85 They say that one chapter "argues reasons why working
women should receive custody, but does not extend this argument to work-
ing men." 86 In so doing, they take a simplistic formal equality approach
that ignores the way feminist arguments were grounded in a discussion of
the unequal sexual division of labour and child care in families under
which women continued to bear the primary burden of family and home
care, even if they were employed. 87 The authors conclude that the possibil-
ity that judicial education is "teaching sexism may be a concern ' 88 and sug-
gest that material presented to the judiciary should reflect "the realities of
child-custody determinations in Canada and the current state of social sci-
ence evidence concerning gender roles and gendered abilities to parent
children." 89 Presumably, they believe that their own article represents the
"truth" in these matters and should be used in the construction of legal
knowledge. They conclude that:
Fathers who wish to parent their children post-divorce today face a situation
si-milar to women entering the workforce only a few decades ago. As in that
case, change for fathers and their children will come slowly, and with much
resistance, unless proactive measures and political action are undertaken.9
0
A number of these arguments were presented orally on April 29, 1998 to
the Special Joint Committee by Paul Millar and the President of the Men's
Educational Support Association, thus entering the law reform discourse.
9 1
Fathers are thus portrayed as victims of a legal system that has been
biased against them and is even more so now that judicial educators have
apparently been misled, presumably by feminists, into believing that the
83 Millar & Goldenberg, supra note 65 at 221.
84 Ibid. at 223.
85 S.B. Boyd, "Child Custody and Working Mothers" in K.E. Mahoney & S.L. Martin, eds.,
Equality and Judicial Neutrality (Toronto: Carswell, 1987) 168; J. McBean, "The Myth of
Maternal Preference in Child Custody Cases" in K.E. Mahoney & S.L. Martin, eds.,
Equality and Judicial Neutrality (Toronto: Carswell, 1987) 184.
86 Millar & Goldenberg, supra note 65 at 223.
87 Young, supra note 50.
88 Millar & Goldenberg, supra note 65 at 224.
89 Ibid.
90 Ibid.
91 Men's Educational Support Association Submission to the Special Joint Committee on
Child Custody and Access (29 April 1998), Proceedings, supra note 52.
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legal system is unfair to women. The argument has come full circle and
feminists are implicitly portrayed as using poor research skills and propa-
ganda that, in turn, has had a direct impact on decision-making in the
courts. The complex relationship between law and social change and the
difference between what law says and how it operates in practice are not
fully developed by Millar and Goldenberg. Yet these authors set them-
selves up as neutral and objective scholars who rely on statistical facts in
contrast to allegedly biased feminist scholars. To the extent that the legal
system and academia give credit to "scientific" social knowledge, it may be
more likely that social science articles that appear to rely on cold, hard data
will be incorporated into legal knowledge. It is, therefore, important that
students and those involved in the creation of legal knowledge through law
reform adopt a critical approach when assessing such studies.
B. Social Science Studies: What is Good for Children of Divorce?
In addition to custody statistics, fathers' rights advocates invoke other
social science studies in their presentations and submissions. In this part, I
focus on the ways in which fathers' rights groups support their argument
that children of divorce will suffer if they do not have frequent contact with
their fathers. This argument is significant because the idea that maximum
contact with fathers is crucial has been taken up not only by the Special
Joint Committee but also by many law reformers and the media. It is also
evident in many judicial decisions. The force of the idea is reflected in the
trend towards shared parenting-which works from an assumption that
both parents should have equal rights after separation unless one proves
otherwise.92 This apparently benign idea has achieved a level of common
sense knowledge that is, in fact, belied by the social science research in the
field. Some researchers have called into question the assumption that main-
tenance of a relationship with an access father is the most important factor
in positive outcomes for children.93 The research shows generally that con-
tinuing contact with each parent is only one factor associated with positive
outcomes for children of divorce. A recent Canadian review of social sci-
ence research in this field has indicated that other key factors are a well-
functioning custodial parent and avoidance of parental conflict.94 As is
obvious, the three factors (continuing contact, a well-functioning custodial
parent and avoidance of parental conflict) can sometimes come into con-
92 In recommending shared or joint custody, G. Landolt, National VP of REAL Women said:
"The mother may be the primary caretaker, but the father should have equal involvement
with regard to medical concerns, education, health. The father should play a vital role in
the child's life." (1 April 1998), Proceedings, supra note 52.
93 J.W. Ellis, "Caught in the Middle: Protecting the Children of High Conflict Divorce"
(1996) 22 N.Y U. Rev. ofL. Soc. Change 253 at 259-61. See also L.B. Silverstein & CF.
Auerbach, "Deconstructing the Essential Father" (1999) 54:6 American Psychologist 397.
94 See M. Bailey & M. Giroux, Relocation of Custodial Parents: Final Report (Ottawa: Sta-
tus of Women Canada, 1998) at 43-58 for a review of the social science literature, online:
Status of Women Canada <http://www.swc-cfc.gc.ca/publish/research/repmt-e.html> (last
modified 08 May 1998).
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flict with one another, yet an emphasis on the importance of contact seems
to prevail. Perhaps more striking is the fact that research at the prestigious
Center for the Family in Transition in the United States, with which the
renowned Dr. Judith Wallerstein is associated, has found that the factors
associated with good outcomes for children in post-divorce families
include:
(1) a close, sensitive relationship with a psychologically intact, conscientious
custodial parent; (2) the diminution of conflict and reasonable cooperation
between the parents; and (3) whether or not the child comes to the divorce
with pre-existing psychological difficulties.95
Moreover, "[t]here is no evidence in Dr. Wallerstein's work of many years,
including the ten and fifteen year longitudinal study, or in that of any other
research that frequency of visiting or amount of time spent with the non-
custodial parent over the child's entire growing-up years is significantly
related to good outcome in the child or adolescent."
96
In light of these research results, it is surprising that the emphasis on
maximum contact has been so pronounced in recent Canadian custody and
access law and in the recent law reform process. In the 1996 Supreme
Court of Canada case on child custody and relocation, 97 one of the interve-
nors, the Children's Lawyer, ignored the contradictory results in social sci-
ence studies and stated: "It is now widely assumed to be self evident that it
is in the child's best interests to ensure the access parent's involvement in
the life of the child." 98 Even though another intervenor, the Women's Legal
Education and Action Fund (LEAF), carefully deconstructed various myths
and assumptions about access, such as the benefits of maximum contact,
showing that these benefits are highly contingent on circumstances, 99 its
points were largely ignored by the Supreme Court.
Similarly, the Special Joint Committee Report stated that "a great deal of
the professional literature about children and divorce concludes that it is in
the child's best interests to have continuing contact with both parents after
divorce," identifying the only exception as when the child experiences vio-
lence by one parent toward the child or other parent. t ° The Committee rec-
ommended that the Divorce Act be amended to add a Preamble with the
principle that divorced parents and children are entitled to a close and con-
tinuous relationship with one another. 10 1 Several other recommendations
95 J.S. Wallerstein & TJ. Tanke, "To Move or Not to Move - Psychological and Legal Con-
siderations in the Relocation of Children Following Divorce" (1996) 30 Fam.L.Qtly. 315
at 311.
96 Ibid. at 312.
97 Gordon v. Goertz (1996), 19 R.F.L. (4"') 177, 134 D.L.R. (4 ,h) 321 (S.C.C.)
98 Gordon v. Goertz (1996), 19 R.F.L. (4'h) 177, 134 D.L.R. (4 h) 321 (S.C.C.) (Children's
Lawyer of Ontario's factum) (Unpublished) at para. 21-22.
99 Gordon v. Goertz(1996), 19 R.F.L. (4 h) 177, 134 D.L.R. (4"') 321 (S.C.C.) (LEAF's fac-
tum (the Women's Legal Education and Action Fund)) (LEAF 1996: 469-491).
100 For the Sake of the Children, supra note 30.
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bolstered this principle without significant caveats. The Government of
Canada Response to the Special Joint Committee, while somewhat more
cautious, nevertheless endorsed the view "that the family law system must
discourage the estrangement of parents from their children."10 2 It stated
that "[a] great deal of the literature in this area concludes that children's
well-being and development can be detrimentally affected by a long-term
or permanent absence of a parent from their lives."
10 3
The subtext of the assertion that maximum contact between child and
non-custodial parent is crucial is that mothers, with the assistance of family
law, have deprived children .of their fathers and that this situation has been
highly detrimental to the mental health of children as well as fathers. This
position is rarely stated in such clear terms, at least by lawyers. But some
fathers' rights groups are quite clear about the subtext:
One of the problems we're facing is that, before a judge, before the bench,
we absolutely have to prove that we are good fathers or that we were good
fathers, whereas the mother doesn't have to prove anything at all. The
mother's mere allegations [of violence] are sufficient for a judge to take cus-
tody away from the father or limit his access.
104
This group also stated that "[flalse accusations of violence made by moth-
ers against fathers in the context of a break-up are increasingly becoming
the standard divorce method used by women to deprive men of shared cus-
tody or access."'
10 5
Some groups referred specifically to the social science research on chil-
dren of divorce to illustrate the damage that children may suffer if deprived
of their fathers. The National Foundation for Family Research and Educa-
tion stated that "[r]esearch has demonstrated that infants who develop
secure attachments to both parents ... function more competently at older
ages than infants who develop only one or no secure attachments."'' 0 6 Inter-
estingly, the fathers' rights groups often referred not to the studies of "chil-
dren of divorce," which offer conflicting evidence, but, rather, to studies of
children raised in single-parent families, especially female-headed single
parent families. The Statistics Canada report, Growing Up in Canada, was
often invoked by the fathers' rights groups in their submissions to the Spe-
cial Joint Committee. For instance, the National Shared Parenting Associa-
tion or NSPA (Saskatchewan) stated that the report showed that:
[H]igh rates of criminal conduct and poor academic performance-very key
indicators of emotional difficulty and low self-esteem amongst young peo-
102 Government of Canada's Response, supra note 42.
103 Ibid.
104 Groupe d'entraide aux pores et de soutien i l'enfant, Submission to the Special Joint
Committee on Child Custody and Access, April 3, 1998, Proceedings, supra note 52.
105 Ibid.
106 National Foundation for Family Research and Education Submission to the Special Joint
Committee on Child-Custody and Access, (8 June 1998), Proceedings, supra note 52.
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pie-exist amongst the children of divorce. That in itself is proof that some-
thing is wrong with the current system.10
7
They also argued that the cost of sustaining single parent (read single
mother families) was very high, whereas single-father families are doing
well. 0 8 The suggestion was made that it is more economically efficient for
children to live with fathers than with mothers. Most such groups then
argued that a presumption in favour of joint custody or shared parenting
must be incorporated into the Divorce Act.
One highly contested argument that fathers' advocates repeatedly make
is that the phenomenon of woman abuse has been overstated and over-
emphasized in Canadian studies. For example, F.E.D.-U.P. argued in its
April 3, 1998 presentation to the Special Joint Committee on Custody and
Access, based on an article in the Winnipeg Free Press, that women hit men
as often as men hit women. These groups contest the Violence Against
Women Survey conducted by Statistics Canada at the request of the Cana-
dian Department of Health in 1993 that showed the systemic nature of male
violence against women."' 9 The groups underplay the point that, although
men can, of course, be the objects of abuse as well as women, there is no
question that women are the most frequent victims of abuse and the most
severely affected. 010
Fathers' rights groups also often argue that women are the primary phys-
ical abusers and neglecters of children.' These arguments appear to be
made in order to defeat the arguments of women's groups that woman
abuse should be taken into account in custody and access decision-making
and that children who witness abuse of their primary caregiver-usually
their mother-suffer emotional trauma from this experience." 2 Some
107 National Shared Parenting Association Submission to the Special Joint Committee on
Child Custody and Access, (30 April 1998), Proceedings, supra note 52. See also, e.g.
Groupe d'entraide aux pares et de soutien a l'enfant Submission to the Special Joint
Committee on Child Custody and Access, (3 April 1998), Proceedings, supra note 52;
Women for United Families Submission to the Special Joint Committee on Child Cus-
tody and Access, (29 April 1998), Proceedings, supra note 52; FatherCraft Canada Sub-
mission to the Special Joint Committee on Child Custody and Access, (1 June 1998),
Proceedings, supra note 52.
108 FatherCraft Canada Submission to the Special Joint Committee on Child Custody and
Access, (1 June 1998), Proceedings, supra note 52.
109 The Canadian Panel on Violence Against Women, Changing the Landscape: Ending vio-
lence: Achieving Equality: Final report (Ottawa: Minister of Supplies and Services,
1993) (Co-chairs: P. Freeman Marshall & M. Asselin Vaillancourt). A more recent study
by Statistics Canada shows that women are subjected to far more severe and more fre-
quent assaults than men: Canada, Statistics Canada, Family Violence in Canada: A Statis-
tical Profile, Catalogue No. 85-224-XIE (Ottawa: Statistics Canada, 2000) at 22; M.
Philp, "Husbands also victims of spousal violence: Statscan" The Globe and Mail (26
July 2000) A3.
110 N. Bala et al., Spousal Violence in Custody and Access Disputes: Recommendations for
Reform (Ottawa: Status of Women Canada, 1998) at 2, online: Status of Women Canada
<http://www.swc-cfc.gc.ca/publish/rcsearch/svcad-e.html> (last modified: 23 February
1998).
111 Fathers' Rights Action Group Submission to the Special Joint Committee on Child Cus-
tody and Access (27 April 1998), Proceedings, supra note 52.
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groups imply that children will be damaged more by lack of contact with
fathers than they will by contact with abusive fathers. Others suggest that
some mothers are abusing children by being cautious about their children
seeing an ex-spouse who is suspected of abuse: "A severe form of child
abuse is when one parent alienates a child from the other parent. Statisti-
cally, this is overwhelmingly mothers more than fathers." 1 13 It has also
been stated that:
If you have custody, then all of a sudden you have all the power, all the liti-
gant power .... If you are going to abuse your child by refusing that child the
right to maintain an ongoing relationship with both parents-so, since you're
the custodial parent, you're saying, 'No, you can't see your daddy today'-
that's harming the child. Then the court needs to address the fact that that is a
form of child abuse."
4
Punitive measures were often proposed by fathers' rights advocates. For
example, Stacy Robb, for DADS Canada, suggested jail time should be
considered in relation to false allegations of abuse. 1t 5 Carey Linde, for
Vancouver Men, said "[t]here should be criminal sanctions against alienat-
ing parents. ' 16 Through these devices, the focus of discussion has become
the importance of paternal contact with children and how the system (and
women) inhibit such contact.
Many of the points made by fathers' advocates have been disputed and
discounted, including this notion that mothers often alienate children from
fathers, and the notion that mothers are favoured by judges. As discussed
earlier, the "children of divorce" research that emerged in the 1970s, as
well as the joint custody "solution," have been deconstructed by social sci-
entists and feminist scholars. Feminists, in particular, have offered an
important critique of both the research itself and how it has been taken up,
and sometimes reinterpreted, by fathers' rights groups and some legal and
helping professionals.'1 7 Scholars working on domestic abuse generally
point out that abuse remains a gendered phenomenon and that the most
serious forms of abuse are directed by men against women. What is impor-
tant, for the purposes of this article, is to note that, despite these careful cri-
tiques, a form of social knowledge that highlights the apparent dis-
advantages of men in child custody law has achieved a good deal of cur-
rency in law reform debates and is influencing the direction of current child
custody law reform in Canada.
113 Vancouver Men, Submission to the Special Joint Committee on Child Custody and
Access (27 April 1998), Proceedings, supra note 52.
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V. CONCLUSION
This paper has attempted to show that legal norms typically reflect a
struggle over the type of social knowledge that should be reflected in law.
Legal knowledge itself is, then, usually the product of power struggles over
the definition of social problems and solutions to these problems. Current
child custody law reform debates are often characterized as battles, in par-
ticular battles between the sexes.11 8 It is thus clear that some sort of conflict
of knowledge is represented in these debates. What is not always clear is that
the playing field remains uneven and cannot be understood without an anal-
ysis of the ways that feminist knowledge remains contested in both law and
society. In general, the "knowledge" that fathers' rights advocates have
offered in the custody law reform debates, even if discredited as extreme at
times, has been taken up by the media and by law reformers who emphasize
(typically in gender neutral language) the need of children to have relation-
ships with two parents, often regardless of considerations of abuse or vio-
lence and typically regardless of the history of caregiving of the children in
question. Although it remains clear that caregiving remains primarily a
female responsibility and that abuse is directed more often and more
severely against women by men than the other way around, these forms of
social knowledge encounter difficulty in their reception at the official levels.
It is, therefore, still crucial to struggle for initiatives in legal education
that assist future lawyers and law reformers in understanding the gendered
power relations and other power relations that influence the processes of
legal change. Courses in feminist legal studies at most law schools have
only existed for less than two decades; courses on racism and the law are
even fewer and are less entrenched. Thorough integration of these forms of
legal knowledge into the curriculum as a whole, as I have attempted to do
in my family law course, is far less developed. A strong commitment to
work on this integration is essential to legal education in the twenty-first
century. In the meantime, courses that focus specifically on the processes
through which gender influences law and law reform are still necessary.
I will end with a teaching story that gives me hope for the future. During
the 1999-2000 academic year, I offered a seminar on child custody law
reform,1 19 in which I specifically sought to engender an understanding in
students of the multiple factors that influence law reform and legal change.
Our starting point was the role of "backlash" or conservative discourses in
reinforcing various gender-based positions of power in the family and else-
where, as well as the inequality of various groups (such as women) in these
processes. We considered new ideas about masculinity that may or (more
likely) may not be reflective of meaningful shifts in the sexual division of
labour in the family or of the challenges that feminism has brought to con-
structions of masculinity and femininity. We also examined the role of ide-
ologies of the (heterosexual, nuclear, middle class) family and of mother-
118 Mason, supra note 49; Bala, supra notel 10.
119 This seminar was offered during spring term 1999-2000 under the title Women, Law, and
Family (Law 365) at the Faculty of Law, University of British Columbia.
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hood and fatherhood, and focused on feminist critiques of the ways these
ideologies have played out in the legal terrain of child custody and access
law. We then analyzed the relative influence that women's groups and
fathers' rights groups have had on recent periods of law reform in Canada
and in other jurisdictions such as Australia, England and Washington State.
We explored the relationship between gender-based power struggles, the
ways in which the key law reform issues are defined, the processes through
which some voices and discourses have achieved a more dominant position
than others and how "compromises" are reached in law reform and the def-
inition of new legal norms. In particular, we observed the ways in which
feminist voices have been discredited or sidelined in the reform debates
despite an organized movement to insert such discourses into the public
debate. We looked at how fathers' rights discourses have been taken up by
the media and by some law reformers, despite the extreme nature of some
of their arguments and the lack of support for their arguments in social sci-
ence studies. At the end of the seminar, we used these tools to critically
assess For the Sake of the Child, the Final Report of the Special Joint Com-
mittee on Custody and Access, discussed above, and the federal govern-
ment's Response to the Report.
This child custody law reform seminar was over-subscribed and most
students were enthusiastic about the materials, the issues and their research
projects. They led class discussions in often very innovative ways, includ-
ing dialogues, "talk shows" and small focus groups. Most of them wrote
very strong research papers.120 In contrast to reactions often received in my
larger family law course, students seemed open to examining the wider
influences on law and on law reform, probably reflecting the self-selection
process of choosing a seminar. These students inspired me about the pur-
pose of legal education and I am hopeful that they will find their own ways,
in their own lives and careers, to challenge the way that legal knowledge is
formed.
120 Six of these papers were published in S.B. Boyd, ed., Child Custody Law Reform: Six
Feminist Working Papers (Vancouver: Centre for Feminist Legal Studies, U.B.C., 2000).
Vol. 20
